[Info-vax] Steve Jobes [was: Apple says ...]

[Michael Kraemer]

JF Mezei schrieb:
> Michael Kraemer wrote:
> 
> 
>>Being a customer back then, I doubt that IBM ever was in real danger.
> 
> 
> Read the book "Who says elephanst can't dance" by Lou Gerstner

And you think an autobiography gives an unbiased description
of his role back then?

> http://www.amazon.ca/Who-Says-Elephants-Cant-Dance/dp/0060523808/ref=sr_1_5?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1318178680&sr=1-5
> 
> IBM had begun the process of breaking up and drawing bankrupcy paper. It
> was that close.

Doubt it. I'd rather consult independent reports from that time frame.
Yes, I remember discussions about splitting IBM in more
independent units, but this isn't necessarily a bad thing.
And two bad years wouldn't have killed IBM.
DEC, a much smaller company, even survived more than five
bad years.
Also, after those bad years, IBM was profitable again.
This can't be accomplished by simply changing the boss,
they had already done the right steps to recover.
Gerstner simply accelerated that.

> 
>>world seemed to be near. However, they had changed their
>>strategy long before that, i.e. deemphasizing the role
>>of the mainframe (and hardware altogether) as the main source
>>of income (the RS/6000 appeared already in 1990),
> 
> 
> They had not changed corporate philosophy. And since the mainframe was
> their core business (like VMS was to DIgital), that policy of
> deemphasising it is what killed IBM.

You are mixing cause for action.
A well equipped S/390 costed millions,
an entry level RS/6000 (or an HP 9000 for that matter)
with almost the same crunch power only a few percent of that.
Which means that from 1990/91 onwards customers dumped their
mainframes like crazy. IBM simply adapted themselves
to this development.

 > Gerstner changed that to try to
> make mainframes competitive.

For the remaining customer base, yes.
Not entirely dumping the big iron certainly
was a smart move, but it wasn't the sole reason for IBM's
resurrection. And the mainframe never was restored
to its original glory either.

> Palmer just continued to produce ads asking VMS customers to ditch
> DIgital and go with Unix.

Can't remember that one.
Sure DEC advertised Unix, since this was the direction
IT was heading back then. Ignoring it would have been
just plain stupid and would have killed DEC even earlier.

> 

> Alpha was THE opportunity for DEC to come back had Alphas been priced
> agressively right from the start.

Alpha was a chip very expensive to develop and produce.
Pricing it "agressively" would have killed the company
even earlier.

> DEC had no direction, no vision under Palmer. You can't execute a
> directioN/vision when your execs play musical chairs game every quarter
> and they spend time learning about their new job instead of doing stuff.

You can't develop a vision when all your energy is absorbed
by plugging the holes your predecessor has left.

> There was not that much that was wrong under Olsen. 

Of course there was, plenty of it.
Neglect of "personal computing" (not necessarily PC),
which allowed competitor's workstations and wintel
to eat DEC's business.
Neglect of Unix until it was (almost) too late.
The VAX 9000 misstep which must have costed billions.
The zigzag course as far as RISC was concerned.
If that Alasir story is right, he even
blew a potential deal with Apple,
which would have given the Alpha the desperately
needed chip sales numbers.
It was Palmer who put emphasis on Alpha,
of course too late and without clear direction.