[Info-vax] SAMBA and Ransomeware

[Scott Dorsey]

Michael Moroney <moroney at world.std.spaamtrap.com> wrote:
>kludge at panix.com (Scott Dorsey) writes:
>
>>Our question, then, becomes this: How do we, knowing we have an inherently
>>untrustworthy protocol, manage to implement it in the safest possible way?
>>Because we have to implement it.  And we have to do it as safely as we can.
>
>I suppose the VMS server process has as few privileges as absolutely possible,
>ideally TMPMBX+NETMBX only, if at all possible.

That's key number one.  

>Naive question: Are the protocols fundamentally broken, security wise, or,
>in theory, could a good VMS programmer given the SMBx spec and no existing
>code as a bad example, write a secure SAMBA implementation from scratch?

Unknown, since nobody has actually seen the SMB spec outside of Microsoft,
and SAMBA exists entirely due to reverse-engineering of the protocol.

SMB1 is fundamentally broken in every possible way.

SMB2 has some things which are alarming but I suspect it's not fundamentally
broken.  But, given the history, I am sure there are some problems in there
that we don't know about yet.  It has been reverse-engineered well enough to
talk to and from, but that doesn't mean there aren't some gotchas somewhere.

SMB3 I have no idea about since I have never seen it, but again knowing the
source I am suspicious.
--scott


-- 
"C'est un Nagra. C'est suisse, et tres, tres precis."