[Info-vax] Intel x86-64 Processor Design Security Vulnerability?

[DaveFroble]

Arne Vajhøj wrote:
> On 1/4/2018 9:25 AM, DaveFroble wrote:
>> Camiel Vanderhoeven wrote:
>>> Op donderdag 4 januari 2018 11:26:28 UTC+1 schreef Johann 
>>> 'Myrkraverk' Oskarsson:
>>>> already5chosen at yahoo.com wrote:
>>>>> There are two new methods of attack - Spectre and Meltdown.
>>>>> Separate page tables only help against Meltdown.
>>>> For people coming late to the party and aren't fully in on the
>>>> difference between the two, this is Meltdown:
>>>>
>>>> https://twitter.com/misc0110/status/948706387491786752
>>>>
>>>> Spectre is harder to exploit, but also harder if not impossible
>>>> to completely patch in software.
>>>
>>> Correct. Meltdown is easier to exploit, and enables data leaks across 
>>> the user mode - kernel mode barrier. This can be patched in the OS. 
>>> Spectre is much harder to exploit, and leaks data across the barrier 
>>> between different processes' user mode (and possibly even from kernel 
>>> mode, but that hasn't been proven). Absent a hardware fix, Spectre 
>>> would require changes to pretty much any and all code - both OS and 
>>> application - to mitigate. Just patching the codepaths that deal with 
>>> sensitive information would not be enough; all code in the 
>>> process-to-be-protected' working set would need to be patched.
>>
>> This is all very interesting, and I don't have a clue about how to 
>> actually perform such exploits, nor do I care to know.  However, I 
>> think there is still one thing that is essential in performing any 
>> such exploits.  One would first need access to the machine.
> 
> Yes.
> 
> But:
> 1) Some systems run multiple applications for multiple users.
> 2) Even for single application/user context it is bad, because
>    it reduces defense in depth - if the bad guys get in without
>    privs then they can use this to get further in
> 
> Arne
> 
> 

Ayep, which is why we're all keeping our systems as secure as we can, right?

There are things an architect can do to protect the important things.

For example, I seem to recall mentioning running web servers on separate 
systems.  These systems have nothing of value on them.  They have static data 
that is provided by the VMS system(s), using service(s).  They can take customer 
orders, but then again pass that data to service(s) on the VMS system(s).  At no 
time is anyone from outside actually running on the VMS system(s).

Make it as tough on the bad guys as you can.


-- 
David Froble                       Tel: 724-529-0450
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