[Info-vax] Intel junk...Kernel-memory-leaking Intel processor design flaw forces Linux, Windows redesign

[DaveFroble]

johnwallace4 at yahoo.co.uk wrote:
> On Thursday, 11 January 2018 05:33:24 UTC, DaveFroble  wrote:
>> JF Mezei wrote:
>>>> Tim Streater wrote:
>>>>
>>>>> If the Japanese panicked and made a mess of the unnecessary evacuation
>>>>> that's hardly the fault of nuclear power. The problem is that people
>>>>> have been lied to about the scale of the danger.
>>> The biggest error was to shut down the reactor, with expectation that
>>> external power would continue to allow the shutdown and cooling of
>>> reactor. Had the reactor not shut down, they would have had internal
>>> power to continue to run the reactor safely even if disconnected from
>>> the rest of the grid and external diseel generators inop due to flood.
>> I'm going to go out on a limb here.  Not claiming I'm correct.
>>
>> I have a suspicion that the plant operators didn't request help in a timely 
>> manner.  Possibly not wanting to "lose face"?  I've got to believe that if the 
>> plant management called the government and said they needed generators right now 
>> that the government could have gotten them the needed generators.
>>
>> As far as that goes, companies and countries that have nuclear plants should 
>> have contingency plans, and equipment that could be moved where needed quickly. 
>>   Obviously, this didn't happen.  And obviously this is hindsight.
>>
>> New plants are designed to have gravity alone deliver water when needed.
>>
>> -- 
>> David Froble                       Tel: 724-529-0450
>> Dave Froble Enterprises, Inc.      E-Mail: davef at tsoft-inc.com
>> DFE Ultralights, Inc.
>> 170 Grimplin Road
>> Vanderbilt, PA  15486
> 
> There may be potentially be a cultural factor involved at
> Fukushima, I don't remember specifically right now. I do 
> recollect that cultural factors relating to "loss of face"(?)
> have historically been a factor in *some* aircraft incidents, 
> but can't bring specific ones to mind right now.
> 
> I do remember that as with many significant failures, the
> Fukushima incident involved a whole string of engineering, 
> management, and regulatory foulups over a number of years. 
> 
> If a significant proportion of those had been addressed, 
> things might have turned out different. But too many weren't
> addressed.
> 
> Further Fukushima-preventability reading includes:
> http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/03/06/why-fukushima-was-preventable-pub-47361
> 
> In a different context, the chain of issues which caused 
> the total loss of Air France Flight AF447 were also relatively
> well known and understood on an individual basis. But they hadn't
> been taken seriously enough by management, individually or
> collectively. It's a surprisingly common situation when the 
> probabilities are small and decreasing, but the impact if 
> Something Bad does happen is high. Which is why some #
> safety-conscious organisations encourage reporting "near
> misses" as well as actual incidents. Statistics can lie,
> but they can also inform.
> 
> Here's a recent AF447-prompted article about the impact of 
> automation and the resultant decline of understanding and 
> skill in modern cockpits:
> https://hbr.org/2017/09/the-tragic-crash-of-flight-af447-shows-the-unlikely-but-catastrophic-consequences-of-automation 
> 
> Asiana Airlines Flight 214 was another incident where lack
> of basic understanding, combined with failures in critical
> cockpit communication, caused a problem, albeit not on the
> scale of AF447.
> 
> AF447 and Asiana 214 are widely documented.
> 
> 
> Now obviously a decline of understanding and skill 
> couldn't have similar impact elsewhere, could it
> Well, not until it becomes interesting to the media
> anyway... 
> 
> The Raspberry Pi exists because one of the founders,
> Eben Upton, who at the time was teaching at Cambridge 
> University, got seriously concerned about the lack of
> understanding shown by his undergraduate intake. This 
> too is widely documented, e.g. Eben Upton's IET Young 
> Professionals lecture from 2012 (around 45 minutes):
> https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-P46sRDDONI
> 
> By all means keep things as simple as possible. But
> someone somewhere needs to understand what's behind
> the curtain, and more importantly the bean counters
> need to trust these people, or Bad Things will be
> on the way.
> 
> Have a lot of fun. 

Correct John.  At some point there needs to be responsibility, and, capability.

You mention Air France 447.  A clear case of the unadvisability of putting 
poorly trained monkeys in the cockpit.  That third pilot, even after being told 
to stop applying "back stick" is what killed all those people.  Yes, there was 
prior problems, but that's why you need pilots, to do some of the "pilot stuff". 
  One of the first things any pilot must learn is that one doesn't prevent the 
ground (or ocean) from coming up to smite you by pulling back on the stick.  I 
seem to recall the guy had maybe 100 hours in type, probably most of them 
watching the autopilot fly the aircraft.  For a pilot 100 hours isn't enough 
experience to properly wipe his ass.

Ok, rant over, for now.

The thing is, why cannot we expect application designers to need similar 
responsibility and capability?  I'm not against the tools Steve is advocating. 
I am against the concept of making things idiot proof, for those who should not 
be idiots.  The idiots will always win, they have all the advantages.

-- 
David Froble                       Tel: 724-529-0450
Dave Froble Enterprises, Inc.      E-Mail: davef at tsoft-inc.com
DFE Ultralights, Inc.
170 Grimplin Road
Vanderbilt, PA  15486